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Data from a heterogeneous-agents economy with incomplete asset markets and in-
divisible labor supply are simulated under various scal policy regimes and an approx-
imating representative-agent model is estimated. Preference and technology parameter
estimates of the representative-agent model are not invariant to policy changes and the
bias in the representative-agent model's policy predictions is large compared to pre-
dictive intervals that reect parameter uncertainty. Since it is not always feasible to
account for heterogeneity explicitly, it is important to recognize the possibility that the
parameters of a highly aggregated model may not be invariant with respect to policy
changes.
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1 Introduction
The Lucas (1976) critique of econometric policy evaluation states that if econometric models
do not capture the primitive parameters of preferences and technology, their coecients may
vary with changes in policy regimes. The quantitative work inspired by the Lucas critique
has proceeded by replacing econometric models that were parameterized in terms of agents'
decision rules with representative-agent dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models in which parameters characterize the objective functions and constraints faced by
representative economic agents. In recent years, estimated DSGE models have been widely
used to study the eects of monetary policy changes (e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2003, 2007;
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005) and scal policy eects (e.g., Forni, Monteforte,
and Sessa, 2009; Leeper, Plante, and Traum, 2010). The tacit assumption underlying the
DSGE model-based policy analysis is that the parameters that characterize the preferences
of a representative agent and the production technologies of a representative rm as well as
the exogenous structural shocks are policy invariant. However, to the extent that macroe-
conomic time series on variables such as output, consumption, investment, and hours are
constructed by aggregating across heterogeneous households and rms, the assumption of
policy invariance is not self-evident. In fact, more than two decades ago, Geweke (1985,
p.206), referring to the newly emerging rational expectations models in macroeconomics,
criticized that while the treatment of expectations and dynamic optimization was careful,
potential problems due to aggregation were usually ignored. We are taking a fresh look at
this issue in the context of DSGE models.
The goal of this paper is to assess the quantitative importance of biases in policy pre-
dictions due to the potential lack of invariance of preference and technology parameters
in representative-agent models. To do so, we simulate data under various scal policy
regimes from a heterogeneous-agents economy in which households have to insure them-
selves against idiosyncratic income risks (e.g., Bewley, 1983; Huggett, 1993; Aiyagari, 1994).
Following Chang and Kim (2006), our model economy extends Krusell and Smith's (1998)
heterogeneous-agents model with incomplete capital markets (Aiyagari, 1994) to indivisible
labor supply (Rogerson, 1988).1 The equilibrium outcomes depend on the cross-sectional
1Both the theoretical and the empirical importance of incomplete asset markets and indivisible labor
supply are by now widely recognized. See, for instance, Krusell and Smith (1998), Chang and Kim (2006),
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007), Nakajima (2011), Krusell, Mukoyama, Rogerson, and Sahin (2008), and2
distributions of households' wealth and earnings, which in turn depend on the policy regime.
Using aggregate times series on output, consumption, wages, and employment generated
from the heterogeneous-agents model, we estimate a representative-agent model with state-
of-the-art Bayesian methods (Schorfheide, 2000; An and Schorfheide, 2007) and examine
the potential lack of policy invariance of the representative-agent model's parameters.
The quantitative analysis generates the following ndings. First, if the representative-
agent model is estimated with data from the heterogeneous-agents economy under dierent
policy regimes, several important parameters vary considerably. For instance, the aggregate
labor supply elasticity, often recognized as a crucial parameter for scal policy analysis
(e.g., Auerbach and Kotliko, 1987; Judd, 1987; Prescott 2004), depends on the cross-
sectional distribution of reservation wages, which in turn is a function of the scal policy
regime. The average level of total factor productivity is also not policy invariant because
scal policy aects labor-market participation and thereby the cross-sectional distribution
of productivities of the employed workforce. It is important to note that using the standards
of the DSGE model estimation literature, the estimated representative-agent model ts the
aggregate time series data from the heterogeneous-agents economy well. A posterior odds
comparison with a more exible vector autoregression (VAR) favors the structural model
by a substantial margin.
Second, to assess the quantitative implications of the lack of policy invariance, we con-
struct predictive distributions for the eects of scal policy changes on output, consumption,
employment, and aggregate welfare based on the estimated representative-agent model un-
der the benchmark scal policy, assuming that the preference and technology parameters
are unaected by the policy shifts. We nd that the prediction bias due to imperfect aggre-
gation is substantially larger than the prediction intervals that reect parameter estimation
uncertainty. While in practice it may not always be feasible to account for various types of
heterogeneity explicitly, it is important for the characterization of uncertainty to entertain
the possibility that preference and technology parameters of an estimated model may shift
in response to policy changes.
As a by-product we conrm a result from the previous literature: the eects of imperfect
aggregation manifest themselves through the presence of preference shocks (the so-called
labor-market wedge) in the representative-agent model. While it is common to include
Rogerson and Wallenius (2009).3
such preference shocks in the specication of estimable representative agent models, their
interpretation is subject to controversy. Some researchers regard them as fundamental
aggregate demand shocks that contribute to business cycle uctuations (e.g., Smets and
Wouters, 2007). Other authors view them as wedges in optimality conditions and thus as
a sign of model misspecication (e.g., Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2007). According
to a variance decomposition computed based on our estimated representative-agent model,
the measured preference shocks explain jointly between 45% and 50% of the uctuations in
hours worked.
While there exists a fairly extensive body of research on aggregation issues and param-
eter stability in econometric models, we will only briey discuss two strands of the liter-
ature that are most closely related to this paper. First, calibrated heterogeneous-agents
economies similar to the one in this paper have been used to assess equilibrium conditions
derived from a representative-agent model in Chang and Kim (2006, 2007) and An, Chang,
and Kim (2009). However, none of the three papers considers the (scal) policy invariance
of the parameters in an estimated representative-agent model. Second, our analysis focuses
on the cross-sectional heterogeneity on the household side and scal policies that distort
households' labor supply and savings decision.2 Much of the literature on policy analysis
with estimated DSGE models, however, focuses on monetary policy analysis in the context
of New Keynesian models. For the propagation of monetary policy shifts, the heterogeneity
on the rm side, in particular with respect to pricing decisions, plays an important role.
Until now the literature on New Keynesian DSGE models has mostly focused on the
question of whether the cost of changing nominal prices is invariant to, say, changes in the
target ination rate. Fern andez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramir ez (2008) estimate a model in
which both monetary policy rule parameters and nominal rigidity parameters are allowed to
vary over time. They nd that during high ination episodes, the estimated cost associated
with nominal price changes is lower and interpret the negative correlation between policy
and price-adjustment parameters as evidence against policy invariance. Cogley and Yagi-
hashi (2010) conduct the following experiment. They simulate data under two monetary
policy regimes from an economy in which rms are heterogeneous with respect to their price
setting history and face some menu costs of nominal price adjustments. Based on the sim-
2Earlier work by Geweke (1985) and Altissimo, Siviero, and Terlizzese (2002) considered heterogeneity
on the rm side, but only in simple partial equilibrium frameworks.4
ulated data, the authors then use Bayesian methods to estimate an approximating model
that assumes that rms are able to re-optimize their nominal prices with a xed probability
in every period as in Calvo (1983). Cogley and Yagihashi (2010) nd that some of the
preference and technology parameters of the approximating model are not policy invariant.
However, in their setting policy recommendations derived from the approximating model
still lead to good outcomes under the data-generating economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the heterogeneous-
agents economy that features incomplete capital markets and indivisible labor. We calibrate
the model economy to match salient features of the cross-sectional income and wealth dis-
tribution in the U.S. as well as some key business cycle properties. Section 3 introduces a
representative-agent model through which we will interpret the equilibrium outcome of the
heterogeneous-agents economy. In Section 4, we estimate the representative-agent model
using data generated from the heterogeneous-agents economy. We also present the quanti-
tative results on the (lack) of policy invariance { changes in the estimates of representative-
agent model parameters in response to changes in the underlying heterogeneous-agents
economy. In Section 5 we repeat the quantitative analysis for model economies with di-
visible labor supply and complete asset markets, in order to distinguish the separate roles
played by the two frictions considered in our benchmark model. Section 6 concludes. De-
tailed derivations for the representative-agent model, data sources, additional information
on the calibration of the heterogeneous-agents economy, and additional robustness exercises
can be found in the online Appendix.
2 Heterogeneous-Agents Economy
We begin by providing a description of the heterogeneous-agents economy that serves as a
data-generating mechanism for the quantitative analysis. The model economy is based on
Chang and Kim (2007), who extend Krusell and Smith's (1998) heterogeneous-agents model
with incomplete capital markets (Aiyagari, 1994) to indivisible labor supply (Rogerson,
1988). Due to the indivisible nature of labor supply the aggregate labor supply depends on
the shape of the cross-sectional reservation wage distribution, which in turn is aected by
the policy regime.5
2.1 Economic Environment
Households: The model economy consists of a continuum (measure one) of worker-
households who have identical preferences but dierent productivities ex post. Household-
specic idiosyncratic productivity xt varies exogenously according to a stochastic process
with a transition probability distribution function x(x0jx) = Pr(xt+1  x0jxt = x). A














s.t. ct + at+1 = at + (1   H)Wtxtht + (1   K)Rtat +  T
at+1  a; ht 2 f0;  hg:
Households trade assets at that yield the real rate of return Rt. These assets are either
claims to the physical capital stock or IOUs, which are in zero net supply. Both asset types
generate the same return Rt, which is subject to the capital tax K.
Households face a borrowing constraint, at+1  a, and supply their labor in an indivis-
ible manner, that is, ht either takes the value 0 or  h. We normalize the endowment of time
to one and assume  h < 1. If a household supplies  h units of labor, labor income is Wtxt h,
where Wt is the aggregate wage rate for an eciency unit of labor. Labor income is subject
to the tax H and  T denotes lump-sum taxes or transfers. Ex post households dier with
respect to their productivity and asset holdings. The joint distribution of productivity, xt,
and asset holdings, at, is characterized by the probability measure t(at;xt).
Firms: A representative rm produces output Yt according to a constant-returns-to-scale
Cobb-Douglas technology in capital, Kt, and eciency units of labor, Lt:
Yt = F(Lt;Kt;t) = tL
t K1 
t ; (2)
We assume that workers are perfect substitutes for each other. While this assumption ab-
stracts from reality, it greatly simplies the labor-market equilibrium because we only need
to clear the labor market through the total eciency units of labor. The exogenous pro-
cess t shifts aggregate productivity and has the transition probability distribution function
(0j) = Pr(t+1  0jt = ). The representative rm's prot function is:
t = Yt   WtLt   (Rt + )Kt: (3)6
The rst-order conditions for prot maximization are
Wt = Yt=Lt and (Rt + ) = (1   )Yt=Kt: (4)
The return on capital (net of depreciation), Rt, is subject to capital tax. The physical
capital stock evolves according to
Kt+1 = (1   )Kt + It; (5)
where It is aggregate investment and  is the depreciation rate. The total factor productivity
process t is the only aggregate disturbance. While this feature of the model economy does
not necessarily reect our views about the sources of business cycle uctuations, it makes
the quantitative analysis more transparent. Since the aggregation error will show up as a
preference shift in the representative-agent model, we intentionally exclude shocks that shift
households' preferences, e.g., labor supply shocks, from the heterogeneous-agents economy.
Fiscal Policy: Fiscal policy in the model economy are characterized by labor and capital
tax rates (H and K) as well as the level of lump-sum transfers (  T). We assume that
transfers are constant over time and the government maintains a balanced budget in each
period. The scal authority collects the revenue from income tax and spends it on xed
lump-sum transfers to households  T or purchases of goods for its own consumption Gt:





In order to obtain total tax revenues we have to integrate over the distribution of household
types using the measure t(at;xt). For simplicity, we assume that government purchases
Gt do not aect the household's marginal utility from private consumption or leisure nor
the production function of the representative rm. The lump-sum transfers are a constant
fraction  of the steady-state tax revenue, that is,









Government expenditures, Gt, adjust to maintain a balanced budget. This specication
simplies the solution of the model.
Market Clearing and Aggregate Resource Constraint: Since IOUs are in zero net
supply, the net supply of assets has to equal the capital stock. Moreover, in equilibrium the






The aggregate resource constraint can be expressed as
Yt =
Z
c(at;xt;t;t)dt(at;xt) + It + Gt: (9)
A detailed description of the computational procedure that is used to approximate the
competitive equilibrium uctuations of the model economy can be found in Chang and Kim
(2007).
2.2 Calibration
In order to simulate data from the heterogeneous-agents economy we have to specify pa-
rameter values for preferences, technology, as well as scal policy. Table 1 summarizes the
parameter values.
Firm Parameters: The unit of time is a quarter. On the production side of the economy,
we let capital depreciate at the rate  = 0:025 and set the capital share parameter  =
0:64 to generate a labor share that is consistent with post-war U.S. data. The aggregate
productivity shock, t, is a discrete approximation of a continuous AR(1) process:
lnt =  lnt 1 + ;t; ;t  N(0;1): (10)
We set  = 0:95 and  = 0:007. These parameter values are obtained by tting an AR(1)
process to de-trended measured TFP (e.g., Kydland and Prescott, 1982).3
Household Parameters: On the household side, we assume that the idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity xt follows an AR(1) process:
lnxt = x lnxt 1 + xx;t; x;t  N(0;1): (11)
The values of x = 0:939 and x = 0:287 reect the persistence and standard deviation of
innovation to individual wages estimated from the PSID.4 According to the Michigan Time-
Use survey, an employed individual spends one-third of his discretionary time  h = 1=3 on
3According to our heterogenous-agents economy, the measured TFP reects the composition eect of
workforce as well as productivity shocks. As explained in detail in Section 4.1, the measured TFP tends to
be slightly less volatile than the productivity shocks. However, increasing the volatility of t does not alter
the quantitative results with respect to the accuracy of the representative-agent model's policy predictions.
4Chang and Kim (2007) restrict the household sample to those with a household head between 35 and
55 years of age with a high school education to avoid the xed eect in wages. With this restricted sample,
the estimates are x = 0:929 and x = 0:227. Here, however, we use the whole sample of PSID, ages 18 to
65, to encompass the overall distribution of wages and obtain a larger shock for idiosyncratic productivity.8
work-related activities. We set the intertemporal substitution elasticity of hours worked
equal to  = 0:4. Given all other parameters, we set the preference parameter B such that
the steady-state employment rate is 60%, the average employment in our sample period.
The discount factor  is chosen so that the quarterly rate of return to capital is 1% in the
steady state. Finally, we let the borrowing constraint a =  2. In our model this corresponds
to half of the annual earnings of the household with average productivity, which is consistent
with the average unsecured credit-limit-to-income ratio of U.S. households { 28% in 1992
and 47.5% in 1998 { reported by Narajabad (2010) based on data from the Survey of
Consumer Finances.
Fiscal Policies: Chen, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2009) construct U.S. labor and
capital tax rates. The capital tax rate fell from 45% to roughly 32% over the period from
1950 to 2003. Over the same time span the labor tax rate rose from about 22% to 30%.
The ratio of transfer in total government expenditure,  = T=(T + G), has shown a strong
trend in the last half century. It rose from 22% in 1960 to 47% in 2010.5 For the benchmark
calibration we choose scal policy in 1984, the midpoint of our sample (H = 0:29, K = 0:35,
 = 0:36). In addition to the benchmark scal policy, 5 alternative scal policy regimes are
considered in Section 4: (i) low labor income tax (H = 0:22), (ii) high capital income tax
(K = 0:47), (iii) higher ratio of lump-sum transfer in government expenditure ( = 0:5),
(iv) the 1960 scal policy (H = 0:229, K = 0:443,  = 0:224), and (v) the 2004 scal
policy (H = 0:269, K = 0:327,  = 0:417). These values, respectively, correspond to the
lower or upper bound or the beginning or end point of U.S. scal policy during the sample
period.
Implications: We now briey comment on some of the key quantitative properties of the
calibrated model economy. Further details are provided in the online Appendix. First, the
benchmark calibration of the model economy generates a reasonable degree of heterogeneity.
According to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the share of wealth of the poorest
20% of families is negative, indicating that they are net borrowers, potentially constrained
in their consumption. This feature is matched by our calibrated model economy. More
specically, the PSID found that households in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th quintiles
5We compute this ratio based on the government consumption (NIPA3.1 Line 16) and net government
social benets to persons (NIPA3.1 Line 19 - Line 13) with the caveat that in reality government transfer
payments are not made in a lump-sum fashion and distributed equally to all households.9
own -0.5, 0.5, 5.1, 18.7, and 76.2% of total wealth, respectively. The corresponding shares
in the model economy are -1.6, 3.3, 11.4, 24.7, and 62.2%, respectively. Households in the
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th quintiles of the wealth distribution earn, respectively, 7.5, 11.3,
18.7, 24.2, and 38.2% of total earnings, according to the PSID. The corresponding groups
earn 9.7, 15.8, 20.0, 23.7, and 30.8%, respectively, in the model.
Second, the cyclical features of the data generated from the heterogeneous-agents econ-
omy are similar to those of a neoclassical stochastic growth model. Since the model economy
allows for an aggregate productivity shock only, the aggregate output of the model exhibits
only about three-quarters of the volatility of U.S. output. Simulated consumption is as
volatile as in the actual data. A striking dierence is the standard deviation of hours. It is
three times more volatile in the U.S. data than it is in the simulated data. This is in part
due to the low-frequency movement in labor supply, not captured in the model economy.
The correlations between output and hours as well as between consumption and hours are
slightly stronger in the simulated data than they are in the U.S. data.
3 A Representative-Agent Model
In this section we describe a representative-agent model through which we will interpret
the equilibrium outcome of the heterogeneous-agents economy.
3.1 Model Specication
We now replace the heterogeneous, borrowing-constrained households of Section 2 with a












s.t. Ct + Kt+1 = Kt + (1   H)WtHt + (1   K)RtKt +  T:
The representative household owns the capital stock and its budget constraint resembles
that of the households at the micro-level. As in Section 2, the return Rt is dened in
excess of the depreciation rate  and the evolution of the capital stock is given by (5). The
aggregate (Frisch) labor supply elasticity is denoted by (> 0). We anticipate that  is
dierent from the micro elasticity of household labor supply , that appears in (1). Our10
representative-agent model nests both inelastic labor supply (e.g.,  being close to zero as
in the micro labor-supply literature) and highly elastic labor supply (e.g.,  = 1 as in
Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988)).
Chang and Kim (2007) document that the lack of exact aggregation leads to a wedge
between the marginal product of labor and the marginal rate of substitution. This labor-
market wedge is also well documented in the U.S. data, e.g., Hall (1997), and often inter-
preted as an intratemporal aggregate labor supply shock, which we denote as Bt in (12).
Nakajima (2005), Scheinkman and Weiss (1986), Kr uger and Lustig (2010), and Liu, Wag-
goner, and Zha (2009) show that capital market incompleteness can lead to a stochastic term
in aggregate preferences that aects the intertemporal rst-order condition of the stand-in
representative household. Thus, we introduce a second preference shock Zt in (12). As is
common in the literature on estimated DSGE models (e.g., Smets and Wouters 2003, 2007),
we assume that both preference shifters follow independent autoregressive processes:
ln(Bt=  B) = B ln(Bt 1=  B) + BB;t; B;t  N(0;1) (13)
lnZt = Z lnZt 1 + ZZ;t; Z;t  N(0;1):
It is important to note that the laws of motion in (13) are not derived from the underlying
aggregation problem, but rather reect a commonly made assumption in the empirical
literature.
The production technology in the representative-agent model is of the Cobb-Douglas




where technology evolves according to the AR(1) process
ln(At=  A) = A ln(At 1=  A) + AA;t; A;t  N(0;1): (15)
The rst-order conditions for the rm's static prot maximization are identical to (4) except
that Lt needs to be replaced by Ht. The produced output is either consumed by the
representative household, invested to accumulate capital, or consumed by the government.
Thus, the aggregate resource constraint takes the form
Yt = Ct + It + Gt (16)11
and resembles (9). As in the heterogeneous-agents economy the government uses its tax
revenues for transfers  T and purchases Gt, maintaining a balanced budget:
 T + Gt = HWtHt + KRtKt: (17)
To construct an approximate solution to the representative-agent model, we log-linearize the
equilibrium conditions around the deterministic steady state and apply a standard solution
method for a linear rational expectations model.
3.2 Econometric Analysis
We use Bayesian techniques developed in Schorfheide (2000) and surveyed in An and
Schorfheide (2007) in Section 4 to estimate the representative-agent model based on ag-
gregated data from the heterogeneous-agents economy. As observables we use log levels of






Bayesian inference combines a prior distribution with a likelihood function to obtain a
posterior distribution of the model parameters. Since  and  are easily identiable based on
long-run averages of the labor share and the investment-capital ratio, we x these parameters
in the estimation using the \true" values reported in Table 1. Moreover, we assume that
the econometrician knows the \true" scal policy parameters (H, K, and ). We also
x the autocorrelation of the intertemporal preference shock process (Z) to 0.99 because
preliminary estimates seemed to drift toward one.6 Marginal prior distributions for the
remaining parameters of the representative-agent model are provided in the rst columns of
Table 2. Our prior is diuse with respect to the coecients determining the law of motion
of the exogenous shocks and assigns a high probability to the event that the annualized real
interest rate lies between 0 and 8% and the aggregate labor supply elasticity falls into the
interval from 0 to 2. The joint prior distribution for all DSGE model parameters is obtained
simply by taking the product of the marginals.
6We also conducted Bayesian inference based on non-dogmatic priors elicited from beliefs about steady-
state relationships as in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008). The results were essentially the same as the ones
reported below.12
4 Quantitative Results
For the presentation of the quantitative ndings it is useful to distinguish between two
groups of parameters of the representative-agent model, namely, policy parameters (p) =
[H;K;]0 and non-policy (or preference and technology) parameters (np). The linearized
representative-agent model has the state-space representation
yt = 	0((p);(np)) + 	1((p);(np))st (18)
st = 1((p);(np))st 1 + ((p);(np))t;
where yt is a vector of observables, st is a vector of latent state variables, and t =
[A;t;B;t;Z;t]0 is a vector of structural shock innovations. We consider three main questions
in the subsequent quantitative analysis.
First, in Section 4.1 the representative-agent model is estimated based on aggregate
times series generated from the heterogeneous-agents economy under the benchmark cal-
ibration. Roughly speaking, conditional on the actual policy 0
(p) we determine an esti-
mate ^ (np)(0
(p)) such that the means and autocovariances implied by the representative-
agent model match the sample means and autocovariances of the data generated from the
heterogeneous-agents economy. Because of the inclusion of shocks to the preferences of the
representative household, we are able to obtain a good match.
Second, we study to what extent the parameters of the representative-agent model are
invariant to changes in scal policy. We do so from two complementary perspectives. In
Section 4.2 the representative-agent model is re-estimated based on data generated from
the heterogeneous-agents model under dierent policy regimes ~ (p). Thus, we examine
whether the parameter estimate ^ (np) obtained in Section 4.1 is approximately invariant
to changes in the policy parameter (p). The answer is negative, indicating that at a
minimum the coecient matrices in (18) as functions of (p) are misspecied. Notice that
a misspecication of @	i((p);(np))=@(p) or @i((p);(np))=@(p) need not be detectable
from the time series t of (4.2) if the policy does not change during the sample period.
In order to assess the economic magnitude of this lack of policy-invariance of the non-
policy parameters (np) the following experiment is conducted in Section 4.3. We use the
representative-agent model parameter estimates obtained under the benchmark policy to13
predict the eect of new policies assuming that taste and technology parameters are policy-
invariant. In a nutshell, using (18) we condition on ^ (np) obtained in Section 4.1 and replace
0
(p) with counterfactual policy parameters ~ (p) to generate predictions of the policy eects.
We assess the accuracy of these predictions by comparing them to the true equilibrium
outcomes from the heterogeneous-agents models. We focus on the prediction of steady-
state eects, thereby evaluating how well the function 	0((p); ^ (np)) captures mean shifts
in the ergodic distribution associated with the heterogeneous-agents model. Section 4.4
discusses potential remedies for inaccuracies of policy predictions.
4.1 Benchmark Estimates of the Representative-Agent Model
We begin by tting the representative-agent model using the aggregate output, consump-
tion, and employment generated from the heterogeneous-agents economy under the bench-
mark scal policy. To be clear, we are not conducting a Monte Carlo simulation in a
frequentist sense. We are computing posterior estimates for two samples only. One sample
contains aggregate time series of 200 observations and the other sample 2,500 observations.
The sample of 200 would correspond to 50 years of quarterly observations. The posterior dis-
tribution computed from the short sample embodies a degree of parameter uncertainty that
is commensurate with posteriors computed from actual data. This will become important
subsequently, because we will compare the magnitude of the policy prediction errors of the
representative-agent model { which are essentially caused by the lack of policy invariance of
the preference and technology parameters due to imperfect aggregation rather than by the
sampling variability of the estimators { to the magnitude of posterior uncertainty. In ad-
dition we consider the unrealistic sample size of 2,500 observations because the consistency
property of Bayes estimators implies that the resulting parameter estimates are very close
to the pseudo-true representative-agent model parameters that minimize the information-
theoretic Kullback-Leibler distance between the approximating representative-agent model
and the data-generating heterogeneous-agents economy.
Posterior means and 90% credible intervals are reported in Table 2. Our subsequent
discussion of the estimation highlights the following four ndings: (i) the estimation of the
representative-agent model detects sizeable preference shocks. (ii) With these preference
shocks the estimated representative-agent model ts the aggregate output, consumption,14
and employment data well in comparison with a VAR. (iii) The estimated aggregate la-
bor supply elasticities are related to the slope of the reservation wage distribution in the
heterogeneous-agents economy. (iv) Due to a composition eect of the labor force, measured
total factor productivity At in the representative-agent model diers from the underlying
technology shock t in the heterogeneous-agents economy. Findings (iii) and (iv) will be
very important for understanding the outcomes of the subsequent policy experiments.
Preference Shocks: Although there are no aggregate preference shocks in the underly-
ing heterogeneous-agents economy, the representative-agent model estimation detects both
intratemporal (Bt) and intertemporal (Zt) preference shocks. For example, for the sample
of 2,500 observations the estimated lnBt has an autocorrelation coecient of 0.92 with a
standard deviation of innovation of 0.3%. According to a variance decomposition based
on the estimated representative-agent model, the two preference shocks jointly account for
between 12% to 15% of the variation in output and consumption and between 45% and
50% of the variation in hours worked.7 While it is dicult to make direct comparisons with
the literature that estimates richer DSGE models on aggregate U.S. data, a substantial
variation of preference shocks for employment or hours worked seems broadly in line with
recent studies by Hall (1997) and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007), and Justiniano,
Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010). Our results suggest exercising caution when interpreting
preference shocks measured from aggregate time series data: they may reect a specication
error (e.g., aggregate error) rather than a fundamental driving force behind business cycles.
Time Series Fit: For policy makers to regard experiments with a representative-agent
model as compelling, it is important that the model be able to track the aggregate time
series reasonably well. This claim is supported by the surge in attention that central banks
paid to New Keynesian DSGE models after Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) introduced
modications to an emerging canonical medium-scale DSGE model that led to a time series
t comparable to that of VARs. Thus, as is common in the literature (for references see, for
instance, Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2007)), we compute the posterior
odds of the representative-agent model relative to a VAR. We nd that the posterior odds
based on the sample of 200 observations favor the structural representative-agent model
7These estimates complement the ndings in Chang and Kim (2007), who construct a time series for
lnBt directly as the wedge between the marginal product of labor and the marginal rate of substitution and
then study its cyclical properties.15
over a VAR(4) with the Minnesota prior8 by e18. While the posterior odds do not imply
that the representative-agent model is correctly specied in some absolute sense, the result
indicates that its cross-equation restrictions are well enough specied such that the resulting
reduction in dimensionality in the DSGE model outweighs the improvement in the in-sample
t attainable with a less restrictive VAR. The inclusion of the preference shocks essentially
enables the representative-agent model to match the autocovariances of the data generated
from the heterogeneous agent economy.
Aggregate Labor Supply Elasticity: The 90% credible interval for the aggregate labor
supply elasticity of a representative household, , ranges from 1.43 to 1.85 for the sample of
200 observations and from 2.02 to 2.24 for the sample of 2,500 observations. As emphasized
by Chang and Kim (2006), in our heterogeneous-agents economy the aggregate elasticity is
determined by the shape of the reservation wage distribution rather than by the willingness
of individual households to substitute consumption and leisure.
Compositional Eect: In the heterogeneous-agents model, the means of the aggregate
log productivity process, lnt, and the average level of the log of idiosyncratic productivity,
lnxt, are zero. In equilibrium the workers who are not working tend to be the less productive
ones. Due to this composition eect the estimated steady-state log productivity in the
representative-agent model, ln  A, is 0.45. Closely related, the point estimates of A and A
imply that the (unconditional) standard deviation of the aggregate technology process in
the representative-agent model is about 1.2%. The standard deviation of the productivity
process t in the heterogeneous-agents model, on the other hand, is about 2.2%. In the
heterogeneous-agents economy, newly hired workers during the expansion are, on average,
less productive than existing workers, lowering the average productivity of the workforce.
Vice versa, it is the low-productivity workers who leave the workforce during the recession.
This composition eect of the workforce makes the measured aggregate productivity less
volatile than the true aggregate technology. It also contributes to a larger estimate of
aggregate labor supply because the measured hours worked (e.g., employment) exhibit a
larger volatility than the total labor input in eciency units. The composition eect is also
8The particular version of the Minnesota prior used in this paper is described in Del Negro and Schorfheide
(2010). The Minnesota prior tilts the maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) of the VAR coecients toward
univariate unit root representations. From a non-Bayesian perspective this procedure is attractive even if
the time series do not follow unit processes because it reduces the sampling variance of the MLE while
simultaneously osetting some of its small-sample bias.16
well documented for actual U.S. data. For instance, Bils (1985) estimates, based on PSID
data, that the average wage of newly hired workers is 19% lower than the average wage of
existing workers.
4.2 Policy (In)variance of Model Parameters
We now investigate whether the parameters of the representative-agent model are invariant
with respect to policy changes. To do so, the heterogeneous-agents economy is simulated
under the alternative scal policies listed in Table 1. In these simulations the sequences
of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks are kept identical to those used for the benchmark
analysis. The representative-agent model is then re-estimated based on the newly generated
data sets. If the representative-agent parameters were truly \structural," the parameter
estimates should be the same (up to some estimation uncertainty), regardless of the policy
regime. The resulting posterior mean parameter estimates and 90% credible intervals for
samples of 2,500 observations are reported in the top panel of Table 3. There is considerable
variation in the estimates of average log productivity, ln  A, the aggregate labor supply
elasticity , and the implicit steady-state interest rate rA, which determines the discount
factor . The 90% credible intervals for these parameters do not overlap. Moreover, the
estimated aggregate shock processes (not shown in the table) are also sensitive to the policy
regime. We now consider the labor tax cut, the rise in the capital tax rate, and the increase
in transfers in more detail. The 1960 and the 2004 policy lead to a combination of the
eects described subsequently.
Labor Tax Cut: In order to shed light on the instability of the parameter estimates,
the second panel of Table 3 provides long-run averages of employment, capital, output,
labor productivity, and interest rates associated with the stochastic steady states of the
heterogeneous-agents economy under the various scal policies. When the labor income tax
rate is lowered to H = 0:22, the employment rate increases by almost 7%. Because of the
tax cut, the total tax revenue, however, decreases. Given the xed proportion of lump-sum
transfers ( = 0:36) a decrease in tax revenues implies that each household receives fewer
lump-sum transfers, which increases the precautionary savings motive. Higher labor input
also reinforces the accumulation of capital given the complementarity between capital and
labor. As a result, the aggregate capital stock rises by 6%, lowering an equilibrium annual
interest rate from 4% to 3.68%.17
A higher capital stock is reected in a low discount rate in the estimated representative-
agent model. Aggregate output increases about 4% (from 1.48 to 1.53). The measured
average labor productivity decreases by 3% (from 2.46 to 2.39) due to the compositional
eect discussed in Section 4.1. In order for the representative-agent model to capture the
compositional eect and the precautionary savings, the estimates of the discount rate, rA,
and average productivity ln  A have to fall, as in the second column of Table 3. As the
average employment rate rises with the labor tax cut, the economy moves toward a thinner
part of the reservation wage distribution, requiring the labor supply elasticity , of the
representative-agent model to decrease.9
Rise in Capital Tax Rate: When we increase the capital income tax rate from K = 0:35
to K = 0:47, the equilibrium employment rate remains essentially unchanged. Thus, the
workforce composition eect is not operational. A high capital tax, however, decreases
savings and results in a decrease in the capital stock of 8% (from 15.2 to 14.0). A decreased
capital-labor ratio raises the equilibrium interest rate from 4% to 4.76%. Unlike the case
of the labor tax cut, the estimates of the representative-agent parameters are more or less
unaected as the employment rate remains approximately constant.
More Transfers: The increase in the ratio of lump-sum transfers in government expendi-
tures from  = 0:36 to 0.5 generates a negative income eect on the labor supply, decreasing
the employment rate to 57%. A larger transfer discourages the precautionary motive of
savings, decreasing aggregate capital stock by 3% (from 15.2 to 14.76). As both capital
and labor decrease, the equilibrium interest rate is virtually unaected. Labor productiv-
ity, however, increases as the employment rate decreases because less-productive workers
retreat from the labor market. The changing workforce composition is captured in the
representative-agent model by a higher estimated value of ln  A. Finally, the heterogeneous-
agents economy moves toward a thicker part of the reservation wage distribution, requiring
a larger elasticity of labor supply for the representative-agent model.
4.3 Accuracy of Policy Predictions
In order to assess the quantitative importance of the policy dependence of the parameters
of the representative-agent model, we now examine the accuracy of the policy predictions
9A detailed discussion is provided in the online Appendix18
that the representative-agent model delivers under the assumption that its parameters are
unaected by policy interventions. To do so, we construct posterior predictive distributions
for the eects of the policy changes based on the model estimated under the benchmark
scal policy. We consider the percentage change in long-run aggregate output, consumption,
and employment as well as the overall welfare eect induced by the policy change.
Welfare Measure: An important advantage of DSGE models over reduced-form models,
such as vector autoregressions, is the welfare analysis. Following Aiyagari and McGrattan




where (a;x) is the steady-state joint distribution of asset holdings and idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity and V (a;x) is the value function associated with the optimal decisions. This is a
utilitarian social welfare function that measures the ex ante welfare in the steady state|i.e.,
the welfare of an individual before the realization of initial assets and productivity, which is
drawn from the steady-state distribution (a;x). We measure the welfare gain or loss due
to a policy change by the constant percentage change in consumption each period for all
individuals which is required to equate social welfare before and after the policy change. We
compare the welfare measures based on the steady-state ergodic distributions only, not in-
cluding the transition dynamics. In the representative-agent model the distribution (a;x)
is degenerate and the computation of the welfare eect simplies considerably. The equilib-
rium of the representative-agent model is approximated with a rst-order log-linearization,
which is known to be fairly accurate for the stochastic growth model considered in this
paper. Under this approximation the welfare eect can be calculated directly from the
steady-state levels of consumption and hours. Further details are provided in the online
Appendix.
Quantitative Findings: The quantitative results for the policy predictions are summa-
rized in Table 4. For now, we focus on the columns with the heading \Estimation Un-
certainty." The entries in the table refer to percentage changes relative to the benchmark
values. The \true" policy eect is computed based on the new ergodic distribution of
10This measure of social welfare or its variants have been widely used in the literature. Examples include
Domeij and Heathcote (2004), Young (2004), Pijoan-Mas (2005), Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2008)
and Rogerson (2009). Detailed justications for this welfare measure are provided in Aiyagari and McGrattan
(1998).19
the heterogeneous-agents economy. The \90% interval" entries correspond to 90% pre-
dictive intervals computed based on the posterior distribution of the parameters of the
representative-agent model obtained from 200 observations under the benchmark scal pol-
icy. These intervals reect the uncertainty with respect to the \structural" parameters
of the representative-agent model. With the widespread adoption of Bayesian methods in
empirical macroeconomics, such predictive distributions are frequently used to conduct pol-
icy analysis under parameter (and model uncertainty) as, for instance, in Levin, Onatski,
Williams, and Williams (2006). Moreover, the use of the predictive distribution allows us
to relate the magnitude of the prediction biases due to lack of parameter invariance to the
overall level of uncertainty associated with the predictions. We also report \p-values," which
indicate how far in the tails of a Gaussian approximation of the predictive distribution the
realization of the policy eect lies.
Across the entries in Table 4 we nd that the \true" eects of the policies, both with
respect to the average level of output, consumption, and hours as well as with respect
to households' welfare, lie almost always far outside the 90% intervals. Almost all of the
p-values are essentially zero. Among the three \single-instrument" policy changes, the
prediction of the eect of a capital tax increase is the most accurate. This is consistent
with our previous nding that the parameter estimates under the high-capital-tax regime
are very close to the ones under the benchmark scal regime. If the representative-agent
model is used to rank the ve alternative policies, its welfare predictions imply that the
labor tax cut is the most benecial and the capital tax increase is the worst policy. The
welfare ranking based on the actual eects in the heterogeneous-agents economy, however,
is quite dierent. The most favorable policy is the increase in transfers. The \1960 policy"
is the worst, leading to a larger welfare loss than the pure capital tax increase. Thus, the
parameter instability is suciently large to render predictions from the representative-agent
model inaccurate and the predicted rankings of policies incorrect.
To gain a better understanding of the results, we now consider the prediction of the eect
of changing the fraction of lump-sum transfers (raising  from 36% to 50%) in more detail.
Due to the income eect, total hours worked decrease by 5.45% in the heterogeneous-agents
economy. The representative-agent model predicts, under the assumption of policy-invariant
preference and technology parameters, a decrease of only 3.04%, to 3.22%, with 90% prob-
ability. The employment eect is under-predicted because the constant aggregate supply20
elasticity of the representative-agent model does not capture the increased slope of the
reservation wage distribution at higher employment levels. The representative-agent model
also under-predicts the rise in consumption. The consumption eect in the heterogeneous-
agents model is stronger, because the transfer increase reduces the need for precautionary
savings for households near the borrowing constraint.
Aggregate output decreases by 2.19% in the heterogeneous-agents economy, whereas,
according to the representative-agent model, it is predicted to fall by 3.04% to 3.22%. The
representative-agent model overpredicts the fall in output for two reasons. First, it misses
the eect of workforce composition on labor productivity. Second, the aggregate capital
stock decreases by more than the representative-agent model predicts, due to less need
for precautionary savings. In sum, the average welfare of households increases by 5.80%
in the heterogeneous-agents economy. The welfare eect predicted by the representative-
agent model, on the other hand, ranges only from 3.10% - 3.18% because the eect of the
additional insurance provided by the transfers is not captured.
4.4 Potential Remedies
The DSGE model research agenda seemingly promises that one can predict the eects of
policy changes without having any observed variation in the policy instrument. In our
simulation, we obtained predictions that were qualitatively reasonable yet quantitatively
imprecise. The rst-best approach to addressing the prediction inaccuracy is to work with
a better model. In practice, of course, \true" models remain elusive and the best response
is to model and measure the policy-relevant mechanisms and trade-os as well as possible.
For instance, while a careful modeling of labor-market heterogeneity was not particularly
important for the assessment of the capital tax change, the representative-agent model's
inability to capture the eects of labor-market heterogeneity rendered its predictions with
regard to labor tax and transfer changes grossly misleading.
Better Measures of Labor Inputs: One of the important lessons we learned from the
heterogeneous-agents model is that the aggregate labor supply elasticity is not iso-elastic.
We will subsequently show in Section 5.1 that replacing raw hours (i.e., the employment
rate) by the eciency unit of labor alleviates the composition bias in the estimates of
productivity and labor supply elasticity of the representative-agent model. With the time21
series of eciency units of labor, both estimates of average productivity,  A, and labor
supply elasticity, , become much more stable across policy regimes. While it is not easy
to obtain the exact measure of eciency units because it is very dicult to capture all the
heterogeneity using observed characteristics, it appears important to measure labor input
more accurately.11
Accounting for Parameter Instability Risk: From the perspective of a policy maker
who has to make decisions based on imperfect models, our analysis indicates that the
parameter uncertainty reected in the formal Bayesian estimation of the representative-
agent model captures only a small aspect of the policy maker's \risk." The results in Table 4
could be interpreted as the predictive intervals being too small because the possibility that
preference and technology parameters may shift in response to a policy change is not being
entertained. Let (np) denote the non-policy-related preference and technology parameters
of the representative-agent model. Moreover, let (np) denote an intervention-induced
shift in the preference and technology parameters. In order to account for the possibility of
a parameter change, a policy maker could combine the posterior distribution of (np) with a
conditional distribution of (np) given (np) to characterize beliefs about post-intervention
values of (np).12
For concreteness, assume the discrepancy distribution is independent normal and the
standard deviations for our parameters rA, , ln  A, and ln  B are 0.09, 0.09, 0.002, and
0.003, respectively. These numbers correspond to the posterior standard deviations of the
four parameters associated with the T = 200 estimates in Table 2. In the rightmost columns
of Table 4 we report the predictive intervals obtained with accounting for the possibility of a
parameter shift (under the heading \Invariance Uncertainty"). While the mean predictions
do not change much, the predictive intervals become a lot wider in the latter case and
encompass the \true" eects on consumption and output. The p-values now range from
0.06 to 0.32.
Exploiting Information from Policy Variation if Available: If an econometrician
has access to observations from dierent policy regimes, statistical techniques such as the
estimation of structural break, regime-switching, or time-varying parameter models could be
11For the composition eect in aggregate measures of wages and hours, see Bils (1985) and Hansen (1993).
12Mechanically, we let the post-intervention non-policy parameters be ~ (np) = (np)+(np), where draws
of (np) are generated from the posterior distribution obtained under the historically observed policy regime
and (np) is drawn independently from the above-specied \prior" distribution.22
used to quantify the magnitude of potential parameter shifts. To examine the detectability
of coecient changes across policy regimes in our heterogeneous-agents environment we
conduct the following experiment. We construct three new data sets by combining 100
observations from the benchmark policy regime with 100 observations from one of the
following alternative regimes: labor tax cut, capital tax raise, and more transfers. The
\true" policy coecients for the benchmark and the alternative policy regime are treated
as known and two versions of the representative-agent model are estimated. In the rst
version, M0, the non-policy parameters are assumed to be identical across regimes, whereas
in the second version, M1, the non-policy parameters are allowed to dier. M1 is estimated
under a prior distribution that restricts potential changes in the non-policy parameters to
be small. A more detailed discussion of the structural break tests is provided in the online
Appendix.
For each of the three data sets we compute log marginal data densities for models M0
and M1. If the alternative policy is either a labor tax cut or an increase in transfers,
the switching coecient model, M1, is favored by the posterior odds. If the alternative
policy is a capital tax increase, the constant coecient model is preferred. These results
are consistent with our earlier result that the representative-agent model delivers relatively
accurate predictions of the eects of a capital tax change, but has diculties capturing
labor market eects.
The estimation results from the structural break model provide some information about
the invariance of the non-policy parameters. Empirical evidence about the sensitivity of non-
policy parameters to changes in the policy coecient could in principle be used to inform
the conditional distribution of (np) given (np) used in the simulations that underlie the
results reported in the rightmost columns of Table 4. The practical problem is that the
estimation of the structural break model provides only very few observations that could be
used to approximate @(np)=@(p).
In our particular application we know that the level of total factor productivity as well
as the slope of the aggregate labor supply schedule depends on the reservation wage distri-
bution. Thus, it might be fruitful to make total factor productivity as well as the aggregate
labor supply elasticity dependent upon the level of employment. However, providing an
operational procedure is beyond the scope of this paper and we leave it as a topic for future
research.23
5 Alternative Measurements and Model Economies
We now modify the empirical analysis in two dimensions. First, in Section 5.1 the representative-
agent model is re-estimated based on three alternative data sets. Two data sets contain
the real interest rate, and in the third data set, hours worked is replaced by a measure of
eciency-adjusted labor. Second, we examine the role of the two frictions, indivisible la-
bor and incomplete capital markets, that prevent the aggregation of individual households'
optimality conditions in our benchmark heterogeneous-agents economy. In Sections 5.2
and 5.3 we repeat the analysis of Section 4 for an economy with incomplete capital markets
but divisible labor and for an economy in which asset markets are complete but labor is
indivisible, respectively.
5.1 Estimating the Representative-Agent Model with Other Observables
The econometric analysis in Section 4 uses output, hours worked, and consumption as
observables in the estimation of the representative-agent model. Since the Cobb-Douglas
production function implies that real wages are proportional to average labor productivity,
the use of output and hours data implies that our estimation is also implicitly using in-
formation from a measure of real wages that is commensurate with our measure of hours
worked. However, we have not used any information about the real interest rate. Thus, we
repeat the econometric analysis based on the following two alternative data sets: (i) real
interest rates, hours, and consumption; (ii) output, hours, and real interest rates. It turns
out that the ndings with respect to parameter stability as well as the inaccuracy of policy
predictions are quantitatively similar to those reported in Section 4. Detailed results are
reported in the online Appendix.
When we replace the hours worked series in the benchmark output-hours-consumption
data set with the eciency units of labor, the estimates of  and ln  A are more stable across
policy regimes compared to the benchmark analysis (Table 5). For example, with eciency
units of labor, the estimate for the aggregate elasticity of labor supply (^ ) ranges from 0.4 to
0.62, implying a smaller aggregate labor supply elasticity.13 The average level of aggregate
productivity, ln  A, remains close to zero across policies. Given the approximate invariance of
13Hansen (1993) obtains a similar result. He nds that hours in eciency units (measured by demographic
variables of the households from the CPS) move less than actual hours over the business cycle.24
parameters, the use of eciency units might appear to be a promising alternative. However,
in practice, it is often dicult, if not impossible, to obtain the eciency unit measures of
quantity (hours) and prices because it is almost impossible to capture all the heterogeneity
using observed characteristics { a typical cross-sectional wage regression barely reaches an
R2 of 0.4.
5.2 Divisible Labor
The rst alternative model economy we consider allows for divisible labor supply, but capital
markets remain incomplete. This is essentially the same specication as in Krusell and
Smith (1998) with endogenous hours choice. The equilibrium of this economy can be dened
similarly to that of the benchmark model with the worker's value function with divisible
labor, V D(a;x;;):













c = (1   H)w(;)xh + (1 + (1   K)r(;))a +  T   a0; a0   a; 0 = T(;):
We estimate the parameters of the representative-agent model using output, hours,
and consumption data simulated from this economy. As Table 5 shows, the aggregate
labor supply elasticity  of a stand-in household is 0.37, very close to the elasticity of
individual households,  = 0:4. Moreover, the estimated standard deviations for the two
preference shocks (not reported in the table) are very close to zero. This is consistent
with a \near perfect" aggregation result by Krusell and Smith (1998) { a representative-
agent model is a good approximation of the heterogeneous-agents economy with incomplete
markets. A comparison of the entries in Table 5 and Table 2 indicates that for the divisible-
labor economy the parameter estimates are much less sensitive to the tax policy than in
our benchmark economy. For instance, the estimate of ln  A is not at all aected by the
policy regime, indicating that the divisibility of labor essentially eliminated the labor-force
composition eect.25
5.3 Complete Asset Markets
Our second auxiliary model economy has complete capital markets but labor supply is indi-
visible. Due to perfect risk sharing, agents enjoy the same level of consumption regardless of
their employment status, productivity, or asset holdings.14 The equilibrium of this economy
is identical to the allocation made by a social planner who maximizes the equally weighted
utility of the population. The planner chooses the sequence of consumption fCtg1
t=0 and
the cut-o productivity fx
tg1
t=0 for labor-market participation. To ensure an ecient allo-
cation, the planner assigns workers who have a comparative advantage in the market (more
productive workers) to work. If a worker's productivity is above x
t, he supplies  h hours
of labor. It turns out that under complete markets, the rst-order condition for the choice
between hours and consumption is exactly dened in terms of eective units of labor and
wages at the aggregate level.
In theory, our estimation of a representative-agent model should reveal the preference
of a social planner. At the estimated parameters the intratemporal and intertemporal rst-
order conditions of the representative household hold almost exactly, and the estimated
standard deviations of the preference shocks are very close to zero. However, since we use
actual hours worked instead of eciency units of labor in our estimation, the estimated
parameters are still subject to a composition bias. According to Table 5 the aggregate
labor supply elasticity, , is estimated to be 1.42. The aggregate labor supply elasticity,
, depends on the cross-sectional distribution of productivity, analogous to the model with
incomplete asset markets. In response to a policy change, the estimates of  and ln  A
change, but not as drastically as under the benchmark economy. The change of the ln  A
estimate from -1.45 to -1.44 under the more-transfers policy indicates the presence of the
labor-force composition eect.
6 Conclusion
Representative-agent dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models are widely used for
economic policy analysis. A key assumption in policy experiments is that fundamental
14The distribution of workers is no longer a state variable in the individual optimization problem. More-
over, because of the ergodicity of the stochastic process for idiosyncratic productivity, the cross-sectional
distribution of workers is always stationary.26
parameters of the model such as taste and technology are invariant with respect to policy
changes. We demonstrate that this is not always the case. We construct a heterogeneous-
agents economy in which equilibrium outcomes depend on the distributions of wealth and
earnings, which in turn depend on the policy regime. We estimate a representative-agent
model that best approximates the aggregate times series generated from the heterogeneous-
agents model. We nd that (i) taste and technology parameters in the representative-agent
model are not policy invariant; and (ii) scal policy predictions from the representative-
agent model are often inaccurate. Moreover, as has been pointed out in previous papers, we
document that the aggregation error manifests itself as a preference shift of a representative
household.
We demonstrate that the representative-agent model that abstracts from cross-sectional
heterogeneity on the household side can potentially mislead scal policy predictions. Of
course there are other forms of heterogeneity, e.g. on the rm side, that may lead to
even stronger biases in policy predictions. Thus, our study should not be interpreted as
a claim that household-level heterogeneity is the most important one or that the use of
representative-agent models should be abandoned. Instead, we conclude that it is impor-
tant to account for the possibility that the preference and technology parameters of an
estimated model may shift in response to a policy change. To the extent that an econome-
trician has access to observations from dierent policy regimes, statistical techniques such
as the estimation of time-varying coecients or regime-switching models could be useful to
quantify the magnitude of potential parameter shifts.
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Table 1: Parameterization of the Heterogeneous-Agents Economy
Preference and Technology Parameters
Firm parameters  = 0:64,  = 0:025
 = 0:95,  = 0:007
Household parameters  = 0:983,  = 0:4, B = 101, h = 1=3, a =  2:0
x = 0:939, x = 0:287
Fiscal Policy Parameters
Bench- Labor Capital More 1960 2004
mark Tax Cut Tax Rise Transfers Policy Policy
H 0.29 0.22 .229 .269
K 0.35 0.47 .443 .327
 0.36 0.50 .224 .41732
Table 2: Parameter Estimates
Prior Posterior (Benchmark Calibr.)
T = 200 T = 2;500
Density Mean S.D. Mean 90% Intv. Mean 90% Intv
rA Gamma 4.00 2.00 2.83 [2.69, 2.97] 2.77 [2.71, 2.83]
 Gamma 1.00 0.50 1.65 [1.43, 1.85] 2.13 [2.02, 2.24]
ln  A Normal 0.00 10.0 0.44 [ 0.44, 0.45] 0.45 [ 0.44, 0.45]
ln  B Normal 0.00 10.0 -1.43 [-1.44, -1.42] -1.41 [-1.42, -1.41]
A Beta 0.50 0.25 0.90 [ 0.89, 0.91] 0.91 [ 0.91, 0.92]
B Beta 0.50 0.25 0.74 [ 0.57, 0.90] 0.92 [ 0.91, 0.93]
A Inv. Gamma .012 .007 .005 [.005, .006] .005 [.005, .006]
B Inv. Gamma .012 .007 .003 [.002, .003] .003 [.003, .003]
Z Inv. Gamma .012 .007 .003 [.002, .003] .003 [.003, .003]
Notes: During the estimation the parameters , H, K, and  are xed to the values in
Table 1 and Z is set to 0:99. rA is the annualized discount rate rA = 400  (1=   1). As
parameter estimates we report posterior means and 90% credible intervals (in brackets).33
Table 3: Estimates under Alternative Policies and \True" Steady States
Bench- Labor Capital More 1960 2004
mark Tax Cut Tax Rise Transfers Policy Policy
Parameter Estimates, T = 2;500
rA 2.77 2.55 2.74 2.84 2.52 2.75
[ 2.71, 2.83] [ 2.49, 2.62] [ 2.66, 2.82] [ 2.78, 2.91] [ 2.46, 2.58] [ 2.69, 2.81]
 2.13 1.44 2.23 3.60 1.22 2.09
[ 2.02, 2.24] [ 1.38, 1.50] [ 2.10, 2.35] [ 3.32, 3.88] [ 1.17, 1.27] [ 1.98, 2.21]
ln  A 0.45 0.42 0.45 0.47 0.40 0.45
[ 0.44, 0.45] [ 0.42, 0.42] [ 0.45, 0.45] [ 0.47, 0.47] [ 0.40, 0.41] [ 0.44, 0.45]
ln  B -1.41 -1.41 -1.41 -1.40 -1.41 -1.42
[-1.42, -1.41] [-1.42, -1.41] [-1.42, -1.41] [-1.41, -1.40] [-1.41, -1.41] [-1.42, -1.41]
Steady States in Heterogeneous-Agents Economy
E 0.60 0.64 0.60 0.57 0.66 0.60
K 15.2 16.1 14.0 14.8 15.4 15.5
Y 1.48 1.53 1.43 1.44 1.51 1.49
Y=H 7.38 7.17 7.17 7.62 6.87 7.44
RA 4.00 3.68 4.76 4.04 4.16 3.80







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Labor-Market Heterogeneity, Aggregation, and the
Policy-(In)variance of DSGE Model Parameters
Online Appendix
Yongsung Chang, Sun-Bin Kim, and Frank Schorfheide
A Aggregate Data Sources
Aggregate capital and labor tax rates are obtained from Chen, Imrohoroglu, and Imro-
horoglu (2009). As a measure of hours we use the Aggregate Hours Index (PRS85006033)
published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The remaining data series are obtained from
the FRED2 database maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Consumption
is dened as real personal consumption expenditures on non-durables (PCNDGC96) and
services (PCESVC96). Output is dened as the sum of consumption, consumption expen-
ditures on durables (PCDGCC96), gross private domestic investment (GPDIC), and federal
consumption expenditures and gross investment (FGCEC96).
For the estimation of the representative agent model based on U.S. data (see Table E-3
below), output, consumption, and hours are converted into per capita terms by dividing by
the civilian non-institutionalized population (CNP16OV). The population series is provided
at a monthly frequency and converted to quarterly frequency by simple averaging. Finally
we take the natural logarithm of output, consumption, and hours. We restrict the sample
to the period from 1965:I to 2006:IV, using observations from 1964 to initialize lags. We
remove linear trends from the log output and consumption series and demean the log hours
series. To make the log levels of the U.S. data comparable to the log levels of the data
simulated from the heterogeneous-agents economy, we adjust (i) detrended log output by
the steady-state output level in the heterogeneous-agents economy under the benchmark tax
policy, (ii) detrended log consumption by the steady state output level in the heterogenous
agent economy plus the log of the average consumption-output ratio in the U.S. data, and
(iii) demeaned hours by the steady state of log employment.Chang, Kim, and Schorfheide (2011): Online Appendix A-2
B Derivations for the Representative-Agent Model
In this section, we collect the rst-order conditions (and their log-linear approximation
around the steady state) of the representative-agent model we use to t the time series
generated from the heterogeneous-agents economy.





t = Et[t+1(1 + (1   K)Rt+1)]
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1=






Notice that the preference shock Zt drops out of the labor supply function:
H
1=






The FOCs of the rms problem are provided in (4).
Steady States: We subsequently denote the deterministic steady-state values by
 H;  K;  ;  C;  Y ;  A;  B;  W;  G;  R:
The steady state value of Zt is equal to one. It is convenient to express the model in terms
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Chang, Kim, and Schorfheide (2011): Online Appendix A-3
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Hence, the steady state of hours worked is given by
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[1   (1   )H]   [=(  R + ) + (1   )K(  R=(  R + ))](1   )
 
1+
Log-Linear Approximation: Denote the percentage gap from the steady-state value of
each variable by
b Ht; b Kt+1;b t; b Ct; b Yt; b At; b Bt; c Wt; b Gt; b Zt; c Rt:Chang, Kim, and Schorfheide (2011): Online Appendix A-4
We obtain the following equations:
[  R=(  R + )]b Rt = b At +  b Ht    b Kt
c Wt = b At + (   1) b Ht + (1   ) b Kt
b t =  b Ct + b Zt
b t = Et[b t+1 + (1   )b Rt+1]
 1 b Ht =  b Ct + c Wt + (1 +  1) b Bt
 Y b Yt =  C b Ct +  K b Kt+1   (1   )  K b Kt +  Gb Gt
(1   )b Gt =
H[c Wt + b Ht] + K(1   )[  R=(  R + )]b Yt
H + K(1   )[  R=(  R + )]
b Yt = b At +  b Ht + (1   ) b Kt
b At = A b At 1 + AA;t
b Bt = B b Bt 1 + BB;t
b Zt = Z b Zt 1 + ZZ;t:
If  = 0 then  G = 0 and we compute the level of government spending rather than percent-
age deviations from a steady state that is zero.
The return on capital Rt is before taxes and net of depreciation. We can dene
R
t = Rt + :









 R + 
=
1=   1
1=   1 + (1   K)
=
1   
1    + (1   K)
:






Thus, the log-linearized equilibrium conditions involving Rt can be rewritten as
^ R
t = ^ At +  ^ Ht    ^ Kt
^ t = Et









^ t+1 + (1   [1   (1   K)]) ^ R
t
i
:Chang, Kim, and Schorfheide (2011): Online Appendix A-5
In the procedure dsgess() the variable rmallst corresponds to  R and rst corresponds to  R.
In the procedure dsgesolv() the variable R corresponds to ^ R
t. The measurement equation
is set up under the assumption that we observe R
t.
C Welfare Measures




where (a;x) is the steady-state joint distribution of asset holdings and idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity and V (a;x) is the value function associated with the optimal decisions, i.e.,










c(a;x) and h(a;x) are the optimal decision rules for an individual whose asset holdings
are a and idiosyncratic productivity is x. This is a utilitarian social welfare function that
measures the ex ante welfare in the steady state|i.e., the welfare of an individual before
the realization of initial assets and productivity, which is drawn from the steady-state
distribution (a;x). We measure the welfare gain or loss due to a policy change by the
constant percentage change in consumption each period for all individuals which is required































where c0, h0, and 0 are consumption, labor supply, and steady-state distribution before the
policy change and c1, h1, and 1 are those after the policy change. A positive  implies that
average welfare improves upon a policy change. With the logarithmic utility, the welfare
gain  can be expressed as
 = exp
 
(W1   W0)(1   )

  1;Chang, Kim, and Schorfheide (2011): Online Appendix A-6
where W0 and W1 represent social welfare before and after the policy change, respectively.
In the representative-agent model the distribution (a;x) is degenerate and the computation















where  C0 and  H0 are the steady-state values of consumption and labor supply in the bench-
mark economy, while  C1 and  H1 are those in an economy with a dierent policy.
D Structural Break Tests
To examine the detectability of coecient changes across policy regimes we conduct the
following experiment. Suppose an econometrician has access to 100 observations from the
benchmark policy regime as well as 100 observations from one of the following alternative
regimes: labor tax cut, capital tax raise, and more transfers. The econometrician knows the
\true" policy coecients for the benchmark and the alternative policy regime and estimates
two versions of the representative agent model.
In the rst version, M0, the non-policy parameters are assumed to be identical across
regimes, whereas in the second version the non-policy parameters are allowed to dier.
The second version of the model, M1, is estimated under a prior distribution that restricts
potential changes in the non-policy parameters to be small. Let
rA; ; ln  A; ln  B; A; B; A; B; 
denote the non-policy parameters under the benchmark regime. Then the parameters under
the alternative policy regime are given by
rAer; e; ln  A+A; ln  B+B; ( 1(A)+A); ( 1(B)+B); AeA; BeB; e
:
Here we use () to denote the cumulative density function of a standard normal random
variable. Note that for  = 0 the parameters are identical across regimes. According our
prior, all 's are independent. Moreover, A and B are normally distributed according to
N(0;0:052). The prior for the remaining discrepancies is N(0;0:12). The following table
provides the log marginal likelihood values for the specications M1 and M2:Chang, Kim, and Schorfheide (2011): Online Appendix A-7
Policy Change M0 M1
None 2796.19 2789.68
Labor Tax Cut 2724.08 2787.15
Capital Tax Raise 2728.52 2724.03
More Transfers 2753.42 2801.42
If the alternative policy is either a labor tax cut or and increase in transfer, the switching
coecient model M1 is favored by the posterior odds. If the alternative policy is a capital
tax raise, the constant coecient model is preferred. These results are consistent with our
earlier result that the representative agent model delivers relatively accurate predictions of
the eects of a capital tax change, but has diculties capturing labor market eects.
E Additional Tables and Figures
Table E-1 compares the quintiles of the wealth distribution in the U.S. data (Panel Study of
Income Dynamics, PSID) to the quintiles of the wealth distribution in the data simulated
from the heterogenous agent economy under the benchmark calibration. Family wealth in
the PSID reects the net worth of houses, other real estate, vehicles, farms and businesses
owned, stocks, bonds, cash accounts, and other assets. For each quintile group of the wealth
distribution, we calculate the wealth share, ratio of group average to economy-wide average,
and the earnings share. The household sample in the PSID cannot capture the right tail
of the wealth distribution of the U.S. economy. Despite this shortcoming, the wealth share
held by the top 20% of the distribution in the PSID, 76.2%, is fairly close to that in the
Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF), 79.6%. See Chang and Kim (2006) for the detailed
comparison of the wealth distributions between the PSID and SCF.
Table E-2 compares second moments of selected U.S. post-war time series to moments
of the corresponding series in the simulated data from the heterogeneous agent economy.
Data denitions for the U.S. time series are provided in Section B of this Appendix. Since
the representative-agent model accommodates a deterministic balanced-growth path, we
remove a linear trend from the U.S. time series of log output and consumption. Since
the model economy allows for an aggregate productivity shock only and our calibration of
the technology shock probably underestimates its variability, the aggregate output of theChang, Kim, and Schorfheide (2011): Online Appendix A-8
model exhibits only about three-quarters of the volatility of actual output. Consumption
is as volatile as that in the data. A striking dierence is the standard deviation of hours.
It is three times more volatile in the actual data than it is in the simulated data. This
is in part due to the low-frequency movement in labor supply, not captured in the model
economy. In fact, the volatility of hours in the model-generated data is about half as
volatile as the standard deviation of actual Hodrick-Prescott-ltered hours, which removes
the low frequency variation. Output, consumption, and hours are all positively correlated.
The correlations between output and hours as well as between consumption and hours are
slightly stronger in the simulated data than they are in the U.S. data.
Table E-3 displays posterior estimates for the parameters of the representative agent model
obtained from U.S. data. We remove a linear trend from the output and consumption
data, normalize mean output such that it corresponds to mean output in the heterogeneous
agents economy, and adjust the level of consumption such that we maintain the average
consumption-output ratio in the U.S. data. It turns out that the estimated aggregate labor
supply elasticity (^  = 0:38) based on U.S. data is much smaller than the estimates obtained
from the simulated data.15 Two salient features of the aggregate labor market of the U.S.
economy are a high volatility of quantities (hours) relative to prices (productivity) and a lack
of systematic correlation between hours and productivity. These features lead to estimates
that imply a low aggregate labor supply elasticity and fairly large preference shocks. A
variance decomposition based on the estimated (with U.S. data) DSGE model parameters
implies that almost all of the variation in hours worked is due to preference shocks.
Figure E-1 plots time series of U.S. labor income and capital tax rates.
Table E-4 provides a variance decomposition of output, consumption, and hours based on
the representative agent model that is estimated with data from the heterogeneous agent
economy.
In order to shed light on how policy changes aect the aggregate labor supply estimates,
Figure E-2 depicts pseudo aggregate labor supply schedules based on the steady-state reser-
vation wage distribution, i.e., the inverse function of the cumulative reservation wage distri-
bution, for the various scal policy regimes. Each curve represents the employment rate (on
the x-axis) at a given wage rate (y-axis). The vertical line denotes the steady-state level of
15A more detailed empirical analysis based on post-war U.S. data can be found in Rios-Rull, Schorfheide,
Fuentes-Albero, Kryshko, and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2009).Chang, Kim, and Schorfheide (2011): Online Appendix A-9
employment under each policy regime. The panels of Figure E-2 illustrate how the elasticity
around each steady state varies with the scal policy. The aggregate labor supply schedule
in the heterogeneous-agents economy becomes steeper toward the full employment level, as
the economy moves toward the right tail of the reservation wage distribution. This pattern
is mirrored in the labor-supply elasticity estimates generated with the representative-agent
model.16
Tables E-5 to E-8 provide results that are obtained when the real interest rate is used as
an observable.
Additional References
Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor, Frank Schorfheide, Cristina Fuentes-Albero, Maxym Kryshko, and
Raul Santaeulalia-Llopis (2009): \Methods versus Substance: Measuring the Eects
of Technology Shocks," NBER Working Paper, 15375.
16The representative-agent-based estimate of the labor supply elasticity is not identical to the slope of the
reservation wage distribution in the heterogeneous-agents economy. The calculation based on the slope of
the reservation wage distribution assumes that the entire wealth-earnings distribution remains unchanged,
whereas the aggregate productivity shock shifts the wealth-earnings distribution over time.Chang, Kim, and Schorfheide (2011): Online Appendix A-10
Table E-1: Characteristics of Wealth Distribution
Quintile
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Total
PSID
Share of wealth -.52 .50 5.06 18.74 76.22 100
Group average/population average -.02 .03 .25 .93 3.81 1
Share of earnings 7.51 11.31 18.72 24.21 38.23 100
Benchmark Model
Share of wealth -1.56 3.27 11.38 24.74 62.17 100
Group average/population average -.08 .16 .57 1.24 3.11 1
Share of earnings 9.74 15.76 19.97 23.72 30.81 100
Notes: The PSID statistics reect the family wealth and earnings levels published in the
1984 survey. Family wealth in the PSID reects the net worth of houses, other real estate,
vehicles, farms and businesses owned, stocks, bonds, cash accounts, and other assets.Chang, Kim, and Schorfheide (2011): Online Appendix A-11
Table E-2: Second Moments of Simulated and U.S. Data
Model U.S. Data
3000 obs. 1964-2006







Notes: () is sample standard deviation, corr() is sample correlation, and (lnH)HP denotes
HP-ltered (smoothing parameter 1,600) log hours. Unless noted otherwise, we extract a
linear trend from the U.S. data before computing the sample moments.Chang, Kim, and Schorfheide (2011): Online Appendix A-12
Table E-3: Parameter Estimates Obtained from U.S. Data
Prior Posterior
Domain Mean S.D. Mean 90% Intv
rA Gamma 4.00 2.00 7.18 [5.60, 9.11]
 Gamma 1.00 0.50 0.38 [0.14, 0.61]
ln  A Normal 0.00 10.0 0.60 [0.58, 0.63]
ln  B Normal 0.00 10.0 -1.49 [-1.57, -1.42]
A Beta 0.50 0.25 0.97 [0.95, 0.99]
B Beta 0.50 0.25 0.98 [0.97, 0.99]
A Inv. Gamma .012 .007 .006 [.006, .007]
B Inv. Gamma .012 .007 .007 [.007, .008]
Z Inv. Gamma .012 .007 .019 [.010, .029]
Notes: The following parameters are xed during the estimation:  = 0:025, Z = 0:99,
H = 0:2, K = 0:2, and  = 0:5. rA is the annualized discount rate rA = 400  (1=   1).
The estimation sample ranges from 1965:Q1 to 2006:Q4 (T = 168).Chang, Kim, and Schorfheide (2011): Online Appendix A-13
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Source: Chen, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2007)
Notes: The data are taken from Chen, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2009).Chang, Kim, and Schorfheide (2011): Online Appendix A-14
Table E-4: Relative Importance of Preference Shocks
B Z
Mean 90% Intv. Mean 90% Intv.
Benchmark Economy, T = 200
Output 5 [2, 8] 5 [4, 6]
Consumption 3 [0, 7] 6 [4, 7]
Hours 33 [18, 45] 5 [3, 7]
Benchmark Economy, T = 2;500
Output 9 [8, 10] 5 [4, 5]
Consumption 9 [8, 10] 4 [4, 5]
Hours 43 [41, 46] 4 [4, 4]
U.S. Data
Output 43 [20, 68] 13 [3, 24]
Consumption 46 [20, 75] 10 [3, 18]
Hours 98 [96, 99] 1 [0, 3]
Notes: The entries correspond to percentages.Chang, Kim, and Schorfheide (2011): Online Appendix A-15
Figure E-2: Aggregate Labor Supply based on Reservation Wage Distribution





















































































Notes: Each curve represents the employment rate (on the x-axis) at a given wage rate (y-
axis). The vertical line denotes the steady-state level of employment under the benchmark
and the no-transfer policy regimes. The numbers in the plots indicate the elasticity of
employment with respect to wages around the steady-state employment rate.Chang, Kim, and Schorfheide (2011): Online Appendix A-16
Table E-5: Estimates under Alternative Policies: H   C   R Data Set
Bench- Labor Capital More 1960 2004
mark Tax Cut Tax Raise Transfers Policy Policy
Parameter Estimates, T = 200
rA 2.63 2.42 2.55 2.66 2.37 2.59
[ 2.56, 2.71] [ 2.33, 2.52] [ 2.44, 2.64] [ 2.60, 2.74] [ 2.28, 2.46] [ 2.50, 2.68]
 1.73 1.13 1.69 2.67 1.07 1.71
[ 1.40, 2.05] [ 0.92, 1.33] [ 1.34, 2.03] [ 2.09, 3.28] [ 0.86, 1.27] [ 1.37, 2.05]
ln  A 0.44 0.41 0.44 0.47 0.40 0.44
[ 0.44, 0.45] [ 0.41, 0.42] [ 0.44, 0.45] [ 0.46, 0.47] [ 0.39, 0.41] [ 0.44, 0.45]
ln  B -1.43 -1.43 -1.43 -1.42 -1.42 -1.43
[-1.44, -1.42] [-1.44, -1.42] [-1.45, -1.42] [-1.44, -1.41] [-1.43, -1.41] [-1.45, -1.42]
A 0.90 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.95 0.94
[ 0.89, 0.91] [ 0.94, 0.95] [ 0.92, 0.93] [ 0.92, 0.93] [ 0.94, 0.95] [ 0.93, 0.94]
B 0.84 0.91 0.89 0.90 0.92 0.93
[ 0.75, 0.91] [ 0.88, 0.94] [ 0.83, 0.93] [ 0.89, 0.92] [ 0.90, 0.94] [ 0.90, 0.95]
A .005 .006 .006 .005 .006 .006
[.005, .006] [.006, .006] [.005, .006] [.005, .006] [.005, .006] [.005, .006]
B .003 .003 .003 .003 .003 .003
[.003, .003] [.002, .003] [.003, .003] [.003, .003] [.002, .003] [.003, .003]
 .003 .003 .003 .002 .002 .003
[.002, .003] [.002, .003] [.003, .004] [.002, .002] [.002, .002] [.002, .003]
Notes: The following parameters are xed during the estimation of the representative-
agent model: H, K, ,  = 0:025, Z = 0:99. rA is the annualized discount rate rA =
400  (1=   1). As parameter estimates we report posterior means and 90% credible
intervals (in brackets).Chang, Kim, and Schorfheide (2011): Online Appendix A-17
Table E-6: Predictions of Policy Effects, T = 200: H   C   R Data Set
Labor Capital More 1960 2004
Tax Cut Tax Raise Transfers Policy Policy
H \True" 6.06 -0.23 -5.45 9.44 -0.21
90% Intv. [ 2.78, 3.21] [-0.34, -0.29] [-3.40, -2.95] [ 4.80, 5.52] [-0.22, -0.19]
Score 8.8E-127 3.9E-010 2.3E-063 1.1E-083 2.8E-001
C \True" 7.33 -2.73 3.04 1.73 3.86
90% Intv. [ 7.44, 7.86] [-3.45, -3.29] [ 1.63, 2.08] [ 2.23, 2.96] [ 3.57, 3.61]
Score 5.8E-003 1.3E-040 1.2E-018 6.8E-005 9.9E-133
Y \True" 3.44 -2.89 -2.19 2.57 0.81
90% Intv. [ 2.78, 3.21] [-3.94, -3.80] [-3.40, -2.95] [ 2.15, 2.87] [ 0.33, 0.37]
Score 2.7E-004 3.7E-114 1.6E-013 4.2E-001 2.2E-308
Notes: The benchmark policy is H = 0:29, K = 0:35,  = 0:36. The entries in the table
refer to percentage changes relative to the benchmark policy. \True" eects are computed
from the means of the ergodic distributions of the heterogeneous-agents economy. 90% Intv.
are predictive intervals computed from the posterior of the representative-agent model based
on observations under the benchmark policy.Chang, Kim, and Schorfheide (2011): Online Appendix A-18
Table E-7: Estimates under Alternative Policies: Y   H   R Data Set
Bench- Labor Capital More 1960 2004
mark Tax Cut Tax Raise Transfers Policy Policy
Parameter Estimates, T = 200
rA 2.56 2.37 2.47 2.59 2.29 2.52
[ 2.45, 2.67] [ 2.25, 2.49] [ 2.34, 2.61] [ 2.49, 2.69] [ 2.16, 2.42] [ 2.40, 2.64]
 2.79 1.55 3.01 3.71 1.65 2.56
[ 2.14, 3.46] [ 1.20, 1.89] [ 2.14, 3.85] [ 2.65, 4.75] [ 1.23, 2.06] [ 1.90, 3.17]
ln  A 0.45 0.42 0.45 0.47 0.41 0.45
[ 0.42, 0.47] [ 0.39, 0.44] [ 0.42, 0.47] [ 0.45, 0.49] [ 0.38, 0.43] [ 0.42, 0.47]
ln  B -1.40 -1.41 -1.40 -1.40 -1.40 -1.41
[-1.42, -1.38] [-1.43, -1.39] [-1.42, -1.37] [-1.42, -1.37] [-1.41, -1.38] [-1.43, -1.38]
A 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
[ 0.98, 0.98] [ 0.97, 0.98] [ 0.98, 0.98] [ 0.98, 0.98] [ 0.98, 0.98] [ 0.98, 0.98]
B 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
[ 0.97, 0.98] [ 0.97, 0.98] [ 0.98, 0.99] [ 0.97, 0.98] [ 0.97, 0.99] [ 0.98, 0.99]
A .006 .006 .006 .005 .006 .006
[.005, .006] [.006, .007] [.005, .006] [.005, .006] [.006, .007] [.005, .006]
B .003 .003 .003 .003 .003 .003
[.003, .003] [.002, .003] [.003, .003] [.003, .004] [.002, .003] [.003, .003]
 .003 .003 .004 .002 .003 .003
[.003, .003] [.003, .003] [.003, .004] [.002, .002] [.003, .003] [.003, .003]
Notes: The following parameters are xed during the estimation of the representative-
agent model: H, K, ,  = 0:025, Z = 0:99. rA is the annualized discount rate rA =
400  (1=   1). As parameter estimates we report posterior means and 90% credible
intervals (in brackets).Chang, Kim, and Schorfheide (2011): Online Appendix A-19
Table E-8: Predictions of Policy Effects, T = 200: Y   H   R Data Set
Labor Capital More 1960 2004
Tax Cut Tax Raise Transfers Policy Policy
H \True" 6.06 -0.23 -5.45 9.44 -0.21
90% Intv. [ 3.24, 3.71] [-0.40, -0.35] [-3.94, -3.45] [ 5.61, 6.41] [-0.26, -0.22]
Score 5.8E-074 4.5E-020 1.1E-031 4.5E-045 1.0E-003
C \True" 7.33 -2.73 3.04 1.73 3.86
90% Intv. [ 7.92, 8.38] [-3.46, -3.24] [ 1.09, 1.58] [ 3.09, 3.90] [ 3.52, 3.57]
Score 2.9E-009 2.1E-020 1.9E-030 3.5E-013 1.1E-120
Y \True" 3.44 -2.89 -2.19 2.57 0.81
90% Intv. [ 3.24, 3.71] [-3.96, -3.76] [-3.94, -3.45] [ 3.00, 3.80] [ 0.28, 0.33]
Score 3.8E-001 3.2E-057 3.8E-024 2.8E-004 6.3E-268
Notes: The benchmark policy is H = 0:29, K = 0:35,  = 0:36. The entries in the table
refer to percentage changes relative to the benchmark policy. \True" eects are computed
from the means of the ergodic distributions of the heterogeneous-agents economy. 90% Intv.
are predictive intervals computed from the posterior of the representative-agent model based
on observations under the benchmark policy.